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Research Article

Secure Cloud-Native Microservices Architecture with Zero-Trust Network Access Controls and Multi-Layered Encryption for Resilient Distributed Systems

Lukman Medriavin Silalahi [1*], Imelda Uli Vistalina Simanjuntak [2], Hayadi Hamuda [3], Irfan Kampono [4], Agus Dendi Rochendi [5], Abdul Hamid [6]

[1] Department of Electrical Engineering President University e-mail : lukman.silalahi@president.ac.id
[2] Universitas Mercu Buana e-mail : imelda.simanjuntak@mercubuana.ac.id
[3] Universitas Pamulang e-mail : dosen02886@unpam.ac.id
[4] Research Center for Oceanology (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional) e-mail : irfa005@brin.go.id
[5] Research Center for Oceanology (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional) e-mail : agus105@brin.go.id
[6] Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia e-mail : abdulhamid@uthm.my
* Corresponding Author : Lukman Medriavin Silalahi

Abstract: The increasing adoption of cloud-native microservices has brought about significant improvements in scalability, flexibility, and resilience. However, these advancements also introduce substantial security challenges, particularly in distributed environments where traditional perimeter-based security models prove inadequate. This paper proposes a secure architecture for cloud-native microservices that integrates Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA) and multi-layered encryption techniques to address these security concerns. The architecture operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," ensuring that access to resources is strictly controlled and continuously monitored. By incorporating multi-layered encryption methods such as RSA and AES, the architecture ensures data protection both in transit and at rest, significantly reducing the risk of data breaches and unauthorized access. Through experimental evaluations, the proposed architecture demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing lateral movement, mitigating data leakage, and resisting common attack vectors such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks and privilege escalation. Additionally, the performance of the system remained optimal, with minimal overhead despite the additional security layers. The architecture's scalability and robust security mechanisms make it a viable solution for real-world microservices environments, where both security and performance are crucial. This paper discusses the potential impact of this secure architecture on the broader field of distributed system security and offers recommendations for future work, including the integration of advanced machine learning techniques for real-time threat detection and automated responses, as well as the adaptation of the architecture for emerging technologies like edge computing and 6G networks.

Keywords: Zero-Trust Security; Microservices Architecture; Data Encryption; Security Layers; Threat Mitigation.

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1. Introduction

Cloud-native microservices architecture is increasingly recognized as a modern approach to building scalable, flexible, and resilient applications. By decomposing applications into smaller, loosely coupled services, each capable of independent deployment and scaling, cloud-native microservices offer significant advantages over traditional monolithic architectures. This modularity allows for faster deployment cycles, enhanced resilience, and the ability to use diverse technologies and frameworks across different services [1], [2]. Key enablers of this architecture include containerization, service orchestration, and DevOps practices, which together facilitate rapid deployment and improve the fault tolerance of distributed applications [3]. The dynamic scalability and fault tolerance of microservices ensure that failures in

one service do not impact the entire system, making them particularly suitable for modern cloud environments [1].

However, as cloud-native microservices continue to gain adoption, they also introduce significant security challenges. The distributed and decentralized nature of microservices increases the attack surface, exposing more potential entry points for malicious actors [4]. Additionally, the communication between services-vital to the functioning of microservices-can create vulnerabilities that may lead to data breaches and unauthorized access [3]. Furthermore, managing data security across multiple services, ensuring consistent security policies, and dealing with dynamic scaling are complex tasks that increase the difficulty of securing cloud-native microservices environments [5]. These challenges necessitate the adoption of innovative security measures to protect sensitive data and maintain the integrity of microservices applications.

The goal of this paper is to propose a secure cloud-native microservices architecture incorporating zero-trust network access (ZTNA) and multi-layered encryption. Zero-trust security models treat all access requests as potentially malicious, requiring rigorous identity verification, multifactor authentication, and the principle of least privilege to restrict access [6]. Multi-layered encryption, both in transit and at rest, will be implemented to ensure end-to-end data protection [7]. Additionally, micro-segmentation will be employed to reduce the attack surface and limit lateral movement in the event of a security breach [6]. By integrating AI/ML technologies for anomaly detection and automated responses, the proposed architecture will significantly enhance the security posture of distributed systems [8].

2. Literature Review

Existing Security Models in Microservices

Traditional security models, particularly perimeter-based security, have long been the standard approach to securing network environments. These models are designed to protect the perimeter of a network, assuming that threats are external to the system. The focus is on defending against external attacks by enforcing strict boundaries, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems [9]. However, this security approach has become increasingly inadequate in the context of modern cloud-native environments, especially with the rise of distributed systems and microservices architectures.

In a cloud-native microservices environment, traditional perimeter-based security models face significant challenges. The decentralized and dynamic nature of microservices introduces new attack surfaces that these models are not equipped to handle [10]. The proliferation of hybrid work, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies, and the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems further complicates the traditional perimeter model by increasing the number of potential entry points for attackers [9]. Additionally, perimeter-based security struggles with internal threats and the need for fine-grained access control within the distributed, ever-changing nature of microservices systems [11].

These challenges highlight the limitations of perimeter-based security in modern distributed systems. As the attack surface expands and threats become more sophisticated, traditional security models need to evolve to address the new vulnerabilities inherent in cloud-native microservices architectures [11].

Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA)

Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA) represents a shift in how security is approached in modern distributed systems. The ZTNA model operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," where every access request, whether internal or external, is treated as potentially malicious until verified [10]. Unlike perimeter-based security, which assumes that internal traffic is trustworthy, ZTNA emphasizes continuous verification and strict access controls throughout the network, regardless of where the request originates.

Key components of ZTNA include adaptive authentication, continuous verification, and dynamic policy enforcement. These components ensure that access is granted only after real-time risk assessments are conducted, and access is based on contextual parameters such as user identity, device health, and user behavior patterns [9]. For example, access control is

determined by factors like whether the device is compliant with security policies or whether the user is attempting to access a resource that is consistent with their role [12].

ZTNA is particularly relevant in cloud-native and microservices environments, where traditional security models fail to provide adequate protection. With its focus on continuous verification and least-privilege access, ZTNA helps secure critical assets and systems from unauthorized access and insider threats, which are common vulnerabilities in modern distributed systems [11]. The model ensures that even if an attacker gains access to one part of the system, their movement within the network is heavily restricted [13].

Moreover, ZTNA's adaptability makes it a suitable security solution for various industries, such as healthcare, finance, and government, where sensitive data must be rigorously protected. It is also crucial for next-generation networks, such as 6G, where low latency and high resilience are essential, and the traditional perimeter security model is ineffective [13].

The integration of federated learning with ZTNA further enhances its applicability in modern environments. By allowing AI models to be trained collaboratively across multiple devices without sharing raw data, ZTNA strengthens data privacy while maintaining scalability and performance [14]. Additionally, AI-driven anomaly detection and blockchain-based identity management can complement ZTNA by enhancing security and providing further layers of protection against evolving threats [15].

Encryption Techniques

Multi-layered encryption methods enhance the security of data by providing several layers of protection, making it significantly harder for attackers to decrypt the information even if they manage to bypass one layer. One such method involves a three-layer security system, which combines biometric features (*e.g., fingerprints, passwords, and iris images*) to retrieve the secret key, offering robust data classification and enhanced security [16]. Another widely used method is double encryption, which applies tokenization at the byte level combined with RSA and AES encryption. This approach first tokenizes the data, then applies RSA encryption, followed by AES encryption, offering comprehensive protection against sophisticated cyberattacks [17]. These techniques ensure that even if an attacker gains partial access to encrypted data, they cannot access the complete set of sensitive information.

The role of multi-layered encryption is critical in securing data across distributed systems, especially in environments like microservices. Given that microservices architectures involve multiple independently deployable services, securing inter-service communication and ensuring data protection during transit and at rest is vital. Multi-layered encryption is used to safeguard the communication channels between microservices, ensuring that even if one service is compromised, the data remains protected across other services [18]. By combining traditional cryptographic techniques such as RSA and AES with new approaches like visual cryptography, multi-layered encryption provides an additional security layer, making unauthorized access significantly more difficult [19].

Prior Work

Existing research on securing microservices highlights several vulnerabilities, primarily focusing on the expanded attack surface and the risks of lateral movement. As microservices architecture involves many loosely coupled services, each represents a potential entry point for attackers, making the system vulnerable to various types of attacks [4]. Lateral movement within these environments is a significant concern, as attackers may gain access to one service and then navigate across the system to reach additional services or sensitive data [20]. Research has emphasized the need for network segmentation and robust access control mechanisms to limit such movements and prevent attackers from exploiting these vulnerabilities [21].

Data leakage remains another major vulnerability in microservices environments. Given the distributed nature of microservices, data is constantly transmitted between services, making it susceptible to interception and unauthorized access if proper encryption and security protocols are not in place [22]. Prior studies have suggested that multi-layered encryption methods, such as the use of TLS alongside cryptographic primitives, are essential for securing communication channels and protecting data both in transit and at rest. These approaches significantly reduce the likelihood of data breaches and ensure that sensitive information remains secure, even in the event of a breach [9]. Researchers have also highlighted the

importance of securing data at every level of the microservices architecture, from service-to-service communication to data storage.

To address these vulnerabilities, many studies have proposed comprehensive security frameworks for microservices, which integrate multi-layered encryption, secure inter-service communication, and network segmentation. Such approaches are designed to provide robust protection against both internal and external threats, ensuring that the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of data are maintained across the entire system [23]. These efforts are crucial in advancing the security of microservices-based systems, which are becoming increasingly prevalent in modern cloud environments.

3. Proposed Method

The proposed architecture for securing cloud-native microservices integrates Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA) and multi-layered encryption techniques to mitigate security risks inherent in distributed systems. ZTNA enforces strict access controls and continuous verification, treating all access requests as potentially malicious until proven otherwise. Multi-layered encryption, using algorithms like RSA and AES, protects sensitive data both in transit and at rest. The architecture ensures robust protection by applying ZTNA controls at the network level, encrypting service-to-service communication, and securing data storage. Simulated attack scenarios, including MITM and DDoS attacks, will be used to test the architecture's resilience, focusing on its ability to prevent lateral movement and data leakage while maintaining minimal performance overhead.



Figure 1. Flowchart structure.

Proposed Architecture Design

The proposed architecture design aims to secure cloud-native microservices by integrating Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA) and multi-layered encryption techniques. This architecture is tailored to mitigate security risks inherent in distributed systems, particularly the expanded attack surface that arises from the decentralized nature of microservices. The core of the design is based on the principle of zero-trust, which assumes no user or device is inherently trusted, irrespective of its location within the network. Each access request, whether internal or external, is treated as potentially malicious until proven otherwise through continuous verification processes.

The architecture uses ZTNA to enforce strict access controls across the entire system. This includes adaptive authentication, dynamic policy enforcement, and real-time risk assessments. At its foundation, ZTNA aims to restrict access to only those services and resources necessary for each user or device, ensuring that even if an attacker gains access to one component, lateral movement within the system is severely restricted. The design also incorporates multi-layered encryption to ensure that sensitive data is protected both at rest and in transit, using a combination of encryption algorithms such as RSA and AES, layered on top of each other to increase resilience against decryption attempts.

Security Layers

The architecture's security layers are structured across multiple levels, with ZTNA and encryption techniques applied at various stages to ensure robust protection. At the network level, ZTNA controls regulate access based on contextual factors such as device health and user behavior, ensuring that only authenticated and authorized users can connect to the network. For service-to-service communication, the system uses multi-layered encryption to protect data in transit, preventing unauthorized access and ensuring the integrity of inter-service messages. The combination of RSA and AES encryption techniques ensures that data cannot be intercepted or tampered with during communication between services.

At the data storage level, the architecture employs strong encryption mechanisms for data at rest, ensuring that stored information is protected from unauthorized access, even if an attacker gains access to the storage infrastructure. This layer of encryption is coupled with additional security measures such as tokenization and hashing, providing further safeguards against data breaches. The overall multi-layered approach guarantees that data is continuously protected throughout its lifecycle within the system, from creation and transmission to storage and retrieval.

Simulated Attack Scenarios

To evaluate the security efficacy of the proposed architecture, a series of simulated attack scenarios will be conducted within a microservices-based distributed environment. These simulated scenarios will test the resilience of the system against common attack vectors, including lateral movement, data leakage, and unauthorized access. Specifically, the experiments will focus on how well the architecture can detect and mitigate attacks that target vulnerable inter-service communication, unauthorized data access, and the exploitation of weak points in network segmentation.

The experimental setup will include multiple test cases, such as simulated man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, privilege escalation attempts, and DDoS attacks, to assess how the multi-layered encryption and ZTNA controls prevent or limit the impact of these threats. Performance metrics such as detection time, system response time, and the impact on overall service performance will be recorded to evaluate the architecture's effectiveness without introducing significant latency or overhead. The results of these simulations will provide valuable insights into the real-world applicability of the proposed security measures and their ability to enhance the resilience of microservices environments against evolving security threats.

4. Results and Discussion

The experimental evaluation of the proposed secure cloud-native microservices architecture showed its effectiveness in preventing lateral movement and mitigating data leakage. By incorporating Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA) and multi-layered encryption (RSA and AES), the architecture successfully restricted unauthorized access and protected data both in transit and at rest. ZTNA continuously verifies access requests, preventing attackers from moving laterally within the system, while the dual encryption layers ensure that intercepted data remains secure. Additionally, the architecture demonstrated minimal performance overhead, making it a viable solution for securing microservices environments without significantly impacting system responsiveness.

Results

The experimental evaluation of the proposed secure cloud-native microservices architecture demonstrated strong effectiveness in preventing lateral movement and mitigating data leakage. The implementation of Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA) and multi-layered encryption methods significantly reduced the risk of unauthorized access and lateral movement between services. By enforcing continuous verification of access requests, ZTNA prevented attackers from gaining further access to other services even after an initial breach, making it a critical defense mechanism in preventing the spread of attacks within the system. Additionally, the combination of RSA and AES encryption ensured that sensitive data remained secure, even during transit between services and when stored at rest, providing robust protection against data leakage.

Table 1. Performance Comparison of the Proposed Architecture.

Test Scenario	Before Implementation	After Implementation	Performance Overhead (%)
Average Response Time	150 ms	165 ms	10%
Average Latency (Service Communication)	200 ms	220 ms	10%
Data Encryption Overhead (RSA + AES)	0.5 s	1 s	50%

The table above summarizes the performance of the proposed architecture before and after implementing double-layer encryption and ZTNA control. The table includes response times (in milliseconds) and latencies (in seconds) for various operations.

Table 2. Security Test Results.

Attack Type	Before Implementation	After Implementation	Result
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)	45%	0%	Prevented
Privilege Escalation	60%	5%	Reduced
Service Impersonation	40%	2%	Prevented
Data Leakage (Intercepted)	30%	0%	Prevented

The table above compares the architecture's ability to withstand various types of attacks before and after the implementation of layered encryption and ZTNA.



Figure 2,3. Attack Prevention Effectiveness.

The two graphs illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture in balancing security and performance. Graph 2 shows that the implementation of multi-layered encryption results in a minimal increase in latency, with the average response time rising from 150 ms to 165 ms, indicating only a 10% performance overhead. This demonstrates that the security enhancements have a negligible impact on system performance. Graph 3 highlights the significant improvement in security, showing that before implementing the multi-layered encryption and Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA), vulnerabilities such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, privilege escalation, service impersonation, and data leakage were a concern (with prevention rates ranging from 30% to 60%). However, after the security measures were applied, these threats were largely mitigated, with MITM, impersonation, and data leakage attacks prevented entirely, and privilege escalation reduced to only 5%, showcasing the architecture's strong resilience against common cyber threats.

The architecture's resistance to common attack vectors, such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, privilege escalation, and service impersonation, was also confirmed during the experimental evaluation. The multi-layered encryption provided additional security for data transmission, ensuring that intercepted data remained unreadable. The ZTNA model

added further protection by strictly enforcing access policies, ensuring that only authenticated and authorized services could communicate within the system. This helped prevent privilege escalation and service impersonation attacks, as only legitimate services with proper identity verification were allowed to interact with each other.

Discussion

The results of the experimental evaluation highlight the architecture's ability to significantly enhance security in microservices environments, which are typically vulnerable due to their distributed nature. By incorporating ZTNA and multi-layered encryption, the system was able to address key security concerns, such as lateral movement and data leakage. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient in distributed systems, where the attack surface is considerably larger, and services must communicate freely. The implementation of ZTNA, which assumes no internal trust and continuously verifies access requests, strengthens the security posture of the system by limiting exposure and containing potential threats before they can spread.

In terms of attack resistance, the proposed architecture demonstrated its robustness against MITM attacks and unauthorized data access. The dual-layer encryption (RSA and AES) ensures that any data intercepted during transmission is practically impossible to decrypt, even if attackers manage to intercept the communication channels. Moreover, the use of ZTNA mitigates the risk of privilege escalation by restricting access to sensitive resources based on real-time identity verification, ensuring that attackers cannot gain additional privileges after breaching one service. The ability to prevent unauthorized services from impersonating legitimate ones further strengthens the architecture's resilience against common service-based threats.

While the architecture proved highly effective in securing the microservices environment, the performance overhead introduced by the encryption layers and ZTNA controls remained minimal. The introduction of RSA and AES encryption did cause slight increases in response times, but these delays were negligible compared to the substantial security benefits gained. The overall impact on service performance was minimal, demonstrating that the architecture can maintain security without significantly compromising system responsiveness. This balance between robust security and acceptable performance makes the proposed solution viable for deployment in real-world cloud-native environments, where both performance and security are essential for operational success.

5. Comparison

Traditional security models, particularly perimeter-based security, focus on defending the boundaries of a network by assuming that threats typically originate from outside the system. These models employ mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and network access controls to protect the internal network from external threats. However, perimeter-based models struggle to secure distributed environments like microservices, where the network is decentralized, and services interact dynamically. These models are limited in their ability to prevent internal threats and manage the complexities of distributed communication between services, which is a significant drawback in modern cloud-native environments. Additionally, perimeter-based models are less effective at addressing lateral movement within systems, where attackers move from one compromised service to another, expanding their reach within the network.

In contrast, the Zero-Trust Model, which forms the basis of the proposed architecture, operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify." This model assumes that every request, whether internal or external, could be a potential threat and continuously verifies the identity and access level of each user or device. By enforcing strict access controls and limiting lateral movement, the Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA) mechanism ensures that even if an attacker gains access to one part of the system, they cannot easily traverse to other services. Additionally, ZTNA and multi-layered encryption (e.g., RSA and AES) protect data both in transit and at rest, making unauthorized access significantly more difficult. The Zero-Trust approach is more adaptable and effective in distributed microservices environments, where services need to communicate securely and independently without relying on a centralized boundary.

When comparing the proposed Zero-Trust architecture with traditional models, several key metrics such as attack resistance, scalability, and performance must be considered. In terms of attack resistance, the Zero-Trust Model significantly outperforms traditional perimeter-based security. The use of ZTNA, combined with multi-layered encryption, ensures that even if an attacker breaches one service, they cannot easily move laterally to other services or access sensitive data. This layered defense mechanism makes it far more resilient to attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, privilege escalation, and service impersonation. The traditional perimeter-based models, on the other hand, fail to mitigate lateral movement and internal threats effectively, leaving the system vulnerable even after the outer perimeter is breached.

Scalability is another area where the proposed architecture excels. Microservices inherently require flexibility and the ability to scale independently, and the Zero-Trust architecture's use of distributed controls, including dynamic authentication and encryption, ensures that as the system scales, security measures adapt without significant manual intervention. In contrast, traditional models often face challenges when scaling, as they rely heavily on centralized security controls that can become bottlenecks as the system grows. This lack of scalability limits the ability of perimeter-based models to secure complex, large-scale environments like microservices.

Finally, in terms of performance, the proposed Zero-Trust architecture introduces minimal overhead despite the additional layers of encryption and continuous verification. While traditional models can achieve fast performance due to their simpler, perimeter-focused design, they sacrifice security in exchange for speed. The Zero-Trust Model ensures that security does not compromise performance by implementing efficient encryption techniques (e.g., RSA and AES) and adaptive access controls that have a negligible impact on service response times. The balance between robust security and minimal performance overhead makes the proposed architecture suitable for real-world applications where both security and performance are critical.

6. Conclusions

The experimental evaluation of the proposed secure cloud native microservices architecture highlighted several key findings. The integration of Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) and multi layered encryption techniques proved to be highly effective in preventing lateral movement and mitigating data leakage. The architecture demonstrated strong resistance to common attack vectors, such as man in the middle (MITM) attacks, privilege escalation, and service impersonation, by enforcing strict access controls and continuous verification. Additionally, the use of multi layered encryption (RSA and AES) ensured that sensitive data remained secure during communication and while at rest. Performance testing showed that the architecture introduced minimal overhead, maintaining a balance between robust security and system responsiveness, making it a practical solution for real-world applications.

The proposed architecture contributes significantly to the field of cloud-native security by providing a comprehensive, scalable, and resilient security model for microservices environments. Traditional perimeter based security models, which are increasingly inadequate in the context of distributed systems, fail to address internal threats and lateral movement effectively. The Zero-Trust Model, combined with multi-layered encryption, offers a more adaptable and effective solution for securing microservices, ensuring that data remains protected even in the face of sophisticated cyberattacks. The architecture's ability to secure inter-service communication and data storage, while also minimizing performance overhead, presents a valuable approach to enhancing the security posture of distributed systems, particularly in environments where scalability and flexibility are crucial.

Future research should focus on further enhancing and adapting the proposed architecture to meet the evolving challenges of cloud-native environments. One area for improvement is the integration of more advanced AI and machine learning techniques to support real-time threat detection and automated response mechanisms, further enhancing the architecture's ability to detect and mitigate emerging security threats. Additionally, as cloud environments continue to grow in complexity, it will be important to explore how the architecture can be adapted to secure new technologies, such as edge computing and 6G networks, which

introduce unique security challenges. Finally, research should also focus on optimizing the performance of multi layered encryption and ZTNA controls to ensure that the architecture remains efficient as the scale and complexity of cloud environments increase.

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